Vectors of Control – Current Events in Xinjiang Cannot be Understood as Only a China "Muslim" Problem — Connecting us with Mission & World Christianity

Tempting handholds while traversing a cliff are called “suckers”. So can we name temptations to quickly tie religion, politics, and ethnicity down with a neat bow. The current situation in Xinjiang cannot be seen, though many news headlines unintentionally summarize it that way, as only China versus Muslims. Xinjiang and Uyghurs are vastly more complex, the same goes for any rock face.

Though it is difficult to see, many scholars would agree that the situation of the re-education centers, the PRC, and Uyghurs (along with other minorities) includes, but does not cook down to, religion. Recently, James Millward, a prolific scholar on Uyghur and China issues, has often brought up the pertinent distinction that China does not have a “Muslim” people problem– They have a historical desire to control many vectors that cause concern, and which have coalesced onto the Uyghur people and culture. These vectors include religion, but not just Islam in Xinjiang. They also intersect and bring focus on peoples in China besides Uyghurs. Sometimes it is easy to look what is happening to Uyghurs, and define it solely a problem of religious freedom (or of Tibetans), however there is copious evidence that the focus of repression includes religion (sometimes in unexpected ways) but is by far not limited to it, or even a necessary component.

Below is a bibliographic essay presenting scholarship and reporting on the situation in Xinjiang. This list of resources will be framed through multiple lines of traditional Chinese governmental and social concern. The reason I present it here, on a blog focused mainly on World Christianity, is that this essay was written for an Uyghur Christian who, while applying for asylum, was challenged by officials that their religion was not Islam, thus they must not be in the cross-hairs of the repression occurring in Xinjiang. Sadly, this was a side effect of headlines rather than real research and understanding. This Uyghur was in danger of having to return to a country that, for many reasons, would put them into a re-education camp. Also, there is evidence that similar tactics of oppression to Islam by the PRC also occurs against Christians in Xinjiang, whether Uyghur or Han. Lastly, as Dr. Russell Moore has pointed out in the Wall Street Journal, we should be defenders of the oppressed and of religious freedom. What PRC officials apply to one people will often be translated to others based on these vectors of control. The below framework hopefully gives a better perspective on how to traverse and assess the phenomenal cliff face of Xinjiang and China.

For those who want a quick breakdown, these are the vectors of control presented in the essay, any of which can bring one to re-education camps. There probably are more (like criminal background of any kind, including being related to someone with such a background), but these give a better framework to understand that what is happening in Xinjiang is not just a “Muslim” problem:

1. Religion, religious expression

2. Minorities, minority interaction, Cultural and language difference to Han majority

3. Scholarship and academia

4. International influence and connections

VECTORS OF CONTROL

Introduction

Many reports on the current climate of China’s Xinjiang province refer to “Uyghur Muslim repression” or “persecution”. The People’s Republic itself names religious extremism, terrorism, and radicalization of Uyghurs as the primary opponents of its mission to pacify the restive region. Though both views are true from certain perspectives, neither fully explain the complexities of the situation. One side stops short of explaining all those who are seriously affected, and the other oversimplifies the motives for the varying repressive actions and policies.

Re-education camps are the latest systematic action by which China’s current regime is attempting to inject stability into Xinjiang’s diverse population (Zenz, 2018). Many who are taken into the camps are Islamic in background and conviction. However, there are many Uyghurs, as well as other minorities, interred who do not fit into a Muslim identity for various reasons (Millward, 2019).

As the PRC views the current situation and instability in Xinjiang, especially since 2009, they do so while negotiating fears of where traditional Chinese, and CCP, areas of concern intersect. These fears do not always intersect where it is easy for Western political bodies to understand. Often the current situation in Xinjiang is seen as the PRC’s response to a Muslim population, having the re-education camps being tied solely to Islamophobia and “curing” of that particular religious expression. While this is true, it is not the only religion in the crossfire, and the re-education camps do not take in just Muslims, or only Muslim extremists. Although the PRC has presented this view for Western media and diplomats, there are many more being interred. So, what framework, besides solely Islamic adherence, can be used in understanding who is suffering from repression and the extra-judicial internment?

Below is a list of traditional and current “vectors of control” which intersect Xinjiang, the peoples who live there, and the PRC government. Religion, ethnic minorities, academia, and international connections are some of the most serious “vectors” (Leibold, 2018). Any one of these areas can place an individual, family, or minority into “re-education” or under the varying degrees of repressive government policies. See below:

I. Religion, and Religious Repression in Xinjiang
The People’s Republic, very much like China’s preceding governments and regimes, view religion as a source of tension and potential cause of instability. Religion is viewed, in a traditional Chinese sense, as an area to be regulated and shaped by the moral power of the current leadership (whether dynastic, Republican, or Socialist). A traditional view of government in China puts a regime’s legitimacy as one of ethical, spiritual, and political center to create and maintain stability. This includes either Islam or Christianity in Xinjiang (Johnson, 2018). Below are articles and research data which corroborates the assertion that religious practice and affiliation of any kind in Xinjiang (and China as a whole) is suspect and liable for repression and incarceration.

Books and Journal Articles

Potter, Pitman B. 2003. “Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China.” The China Quarterly 174, no. 1: 317-337.

Yang, Fenggang. 2013. “A Research Agenda on Religious Freedom in China.” Review of Faith & International Affairs 11, no. 2: 6-17.

News Articles

Keck, Zachary. September 12, 2014. “Why is China Nationalizing Christianity?” The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/why-is-china-nationalizing-christianity/ (accessed January 17, 2019).

Pedroletti, Brice. July 4, 2014. “China’s Christians Fear New Persecution After Latest Wave of Demolitions.” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/05/china-christianity-wenzhou-zhejiang-churches/print (accessed January 17, 2019) .

Johnson, Ian. November 23, 2018. “The Uighurs and China’s Long History of Trouble with Islam.” https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/11/23/the-uighurs-and-chinas-long-history-of-trouble-with-islam/ (accessed January 18, 2019).

“Abrahamic faiths posed a special challenge to the Chinese religious view. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam claim an exclusive path to salvation: there is only one god, our god, and if you don’t follow him you will go to hell. That’s a rather stripped-down version . . . but this monolithic view [presents] a problem to Chinese syncretism.”

Some Data on Pan-Religious Oppression in Xinjiang

Lui, Otto. Development of Chinese Church Leaders: A Study of Relational Leadership in Contemporary Chinese Churches. Cumbria, CA: Langham Monographs, 2013.

This work gives testimony of the overall atmosphere of religion, minorities, and government regulation in Xinjiang. Han Christians, living in Urumqi, are not allowed to receive Uyghurs, being a “Muslim” minority, into church services. Christian ministry is also not allowed. Thus, from this work we can strongly infer that the idea of a Uyghur being Christian would cause great concern for local officials and cause dramatic repercussions on both local Han Christians and the Uyghurs they might interact with.

Uyghur Human Rights Project. September 16, 2014. “Alimjan Yimit.” https://uhrp.org/ political-prisoners-2014/alimjan-yimit (accessed January 18, 2019).

Alimjan Yimit is a well-publicized case of an Uyghur who was incarcerated because of his religious affiliation, Christian, and his career working with foreign companies in Xinjiang. With religious “norm” of Uyghurs identifying as Muslim, and Alimjan being a Christian, this alone would give concern to local authorities. Chinese officials and prevalent “common knowledge” would be fearful and suspect of religious change, let alone strong religious belief.

Copeland, Michael. 2018. Foreign Devils, Familiar Strangers: Han Christian Diffusion Among Uyghur Muslims. Ph.D. Dissertation, SWBTS.

This dissertation contains a Han Christian interview reporting of local Xinjiang repression of Christians in the State regulated and registered Three-Self Patriotic Movement churches. It gives testimony of churches being shut down, home meetings regulated to only three persons, personal identification being checked (and preventing students or children from attendance), police questioning, and confiscation of personal religious materials such as crosses, Bibles, and religious calendars meant to hang on home walls (pages 274-275). These are very similar actions as reported among Uyghur Muslims, with the confiscation of governmental published Qurans and religious decorative materials being taken from homes.

Yang, Fenggang. 2017. “From Cooperation to Resistance: Christian Responses to Intensified Suppression in China Today.” Review of Faith & International Affairs 15, no. 1: 79-90.

Yang, director of the Center on Religion and Chinese Society at Purdue University, writes here of the Han Christian response to the latest heavy regulation and repression of both TSPM and un-registered religious expression in China. Beginning in 2014 the PRC has been desiring to Sinicize Christianity within the country. This article gives evidence to that continued situation and the varying options which Han Christians have attempted in response.

There is an important question to be asked based on the above data and articles. If Han Christians inside of Xinjiang, and in China as a whole, are encountering serious repression, how much more would an Uyghur identifying as such? Often Christianity is suspect by government officials as a religion at the whim of Western powers. If a Han from Wenzhou is suspect of foreign influence based on their beliefs, so much more would an Uyghur Christian living outside of China. Such a person would cross several “vectors of control” which lead to internment in a re-education center.

II. Academia, Scholarship, and Intellectuals:
Intellectuals and academics in China have a long history of clashing and being heavily repressed or regulated by the PRC. This is even more true for Uyghurs, even those who do not adhere to any religious affiliation (which is forbidden in Chinese schools and universities). Below are articles which speak to the vast amount of Uyghur intellectuals disappearing from academic posts and families in Xinjiang.

Leibold, James. November 28, 2018. “Mind Control in China Has a Very Long History.” https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/28/opinion/china-reeducation-mind-control-xinjiang.html?rref=collection/sectioncollection/opinion&action=click&contentCollection=opinion&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=sectionfront (accessed January 18, 2019).

Leibold traces the historical Chinese view of healing those with “incorrigible” beliefs that are contrary to the moral and political authority of the ruling regime. He discusses how this is revisited by how “. . . President Xi Jinping seems to be intensifying repression again — against ethnic minorities, intellectuals, lawyers, Christians, labor activists, even Maoist students.”

Karine Azoulay, Brendan Naef. 2018. What We Heard: A Summary of Testimony on the Human Rights Situation of Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims. The Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the House of Commons Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International Development.

This Canadian Parliamentary document attests the “criminalization of the Uyghur identity through overly broad ‘Anti-Terror’ laws.” It discusses these broad policies affecting Uyghurs, and Uyghur intellectuals, through the re-education camp system, isolating Xinjiang from international relationships and connections, harassment of Uyghurs overseas, and forced returns to China. The last of which often lead to internment in a re-education center.

Ramzy, Austin. January 5, 2019. “China Targets Prominent Uighur Intellectuals to Erase an Ethnic Identity.” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/china-xinjiang-uighur-intellectuals.html (accessed January 21, 2019).

This article tells of Qurban Mamut and Rahile Dawut, two Uyghur scholars who have disappeared and are presumed to be interred in Xinjiang’s re-education system. One of Ramzy’s sources suggests that “The removal of high‐profile Uighur scholars familiar with the Chinese government, and the country’s education and legal systems, is aimed at erasing not only the group’s unique ethnic identity but also its ability to defend such traditions. . . ”

Millward, James. February 7, 2019. “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims.” https://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 2019/02/07/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims/ (accessed January 18, 2019).

James Millward also mentions Uyghur scholar and photographer Rahile Dawut, who disappeared in 2017, presumably to “re-education.” Her background includes at least three “vectors of control” for PRC authorities– international connections, minority and cultural studies, and scholarship in general. Dawut’s work, mentioned by Millward, shows these vectors clearly. One such work, Mazar: Studies in Islamic Sacred Sites in Central Eurasia, was published outside of China from Tokyo University Foreign Studies Press in 2016.

Also, before the current climate of taking Uyghur intellectuals into “re-education” Millward discusses another scholar who was arrested in 2014 for ‘seperatism.’ What caused his arrest was being a Uyghur scholar that “was simply to press for genuine observance of the minzu-friendly laws and constitutional provisions already on the books.”

III. Minorities and Ethnic Conflict:
Minorities have had conflicting history in China, and under the CCP ideology. Marxist/Socialist politics dictate the recognition of ethnic groups, respecting their distinctives, while at the same time “uniting” them as the proletariat. In China history, minorities (or minzu in Mandarin) have caused instability through uprisings, inter-group violence, and protest (Roberts, 2018). This is even more so in Xinjiang history and the intersection of minority politics in a border region (which will be discussed further) causes Uyghur and other minority distinctive differences from the Han majority as another reason for internment into “re-education camps”. It is important to note language and minority politics are historically tied together in the PRC view (Mullaney, 2011). Ethnic minority language (its literature, study, and use) is often part of the PRC repressive policies in the region and is directly targeted in Re-education centers.

Bovingdon, Gardner. 2004. “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent.”

Millward, James. 2004. “Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment.”

Yee, Herbert S. 2005. “Ethnic Consciousness and Identity: A Research Report on Uygur - Han Relations in Xinjiang”. Asian Ethnicity 6, no. 1: 35-50.

Han, E. 2010. “Boundaries, Discrimination, and Interethnic Conflict in Xinjiang, China.” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 4, no. 2: 244-256.

Clarke, Michael. 2010 “China, Xinjiang and the Internationalisation of the Uyghur Issue.” Global Change, Peace & Security 22, no. 2: 213-229.

Mullaney, Thomas. 2011. Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Asia: Local Studies / Global Themes). University of California Press.

Grose, Timothy. “Uyghur Language Textbooks: Competing Images of a Multi-Ethnic China.” Asian Studies Review 36, no. 3 (2012): 369-389.

Leibold, James. 2014. “Xinhai Remembered: From Han Racial Revolution to Great Revival of the Chinese Nation.” Asian Ethnicity 15, no. 1: 1-20.

Fang, Qiang. 2015. “Struggling for a Better Solution: Chinese Communist Party and Minorities, 1921-Present.” In Ethnic China: Identity, Assimilation, and Resistance, ed. Patrick Fuliang Shan Li Xiaobing, 312. New York: Lexington Books.

Ang, Jennifer. 2016. “Sinicizing the Uyghurs.” Peace Review 28, no. 4: 399-406.

Ang argues that the “Sinicization efforts aimed at securing the cooperation of the Uyghurs has back-fired because it continues to be Han-centric, and has the effects of diluting Han identity and culture.” This shown through PRC “socioeconomic and educational development” in the region, such as influx of Han Chinese into the region, Han ethnocentrism and emphasis on Mandarin language education.

Friedrichs, Jorg. 2017. Sino-Muslim Relations: The Han, the Hui, and the Uyghurs. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 37, no. 1: 55-79.

Though at first glance this article’s subject is religious interaction, its true intent is showing the perceived cultural and “spatial” difference between many so-called Muslim minorities and the majority Han. Friedrichs concludes this spatial difference is a strong factor in PRC repressive policies and strict surveillance of minorities, especially ones with strong traditional religious adherence.

Zhou, Zunyou. 2017. “Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization.” Terrorism and Political Violence 1-23.

Zhou gives an ominous picture of official efforts in Xinjiang to “de-radicalize” the region. Coming on the eve of the current Party leader Chen Quanguo’s implementation of the re-education camps, Zhou points out the dubious “victories” of prior efforts. These previous efforts focused on pacification through working with local officials and registered religious leaders. Though these policies and government actions, including “education” for convicted individuals, were severe this work infers that more intense solutions might need to be applied to the “Xinjiang problem.”

Roberts, Sean R. 2018. “The Biopolitics of China’s ‘War on Terror’ and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs.” Critical Asian Studies 50, no. 2: 232-258.

News Articles

Greer, Tanner. September 13, 2018. “48 Ways to Get Sent to a Chinese Concentration Camp.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/13/48-ways-to-get-sent-to-a-chinese-concentration-camp/ (accessed January 17, 2019, 2019).

This article presents different actions, characteristics, and persons which are varying reasons for internment in a re-education camp. Specific to minority status is the use of Uyghur language and inability to function in Mandarin.

Deaeth, Duncan. November 11, 2018. “China May Be Planning Xinjiang-style Concentration Camps in Ningxia.” https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3586905 (accessed January 17, 2019).

The above news article suggests that the re-education center system might expand across other ethnic and religious lines. The province of Ningxia holds one of China’s greatest concentrations of Hui Muslims. Hui have many similar nexuses as Uyghurs for special attention by the PRC– strong religious affiliation and ethnic minority status.

Millward, James. February 7, 2019. “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims.” https://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 2019/02/07/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims/ (accessed January 18, 2019).

James Millward, author of Eurasian Crossroads and expert on Xinjiang and Chinese history and politics, discusses testimony of Kazaks interred in re-education camps in Xinjiang. Millward also discusses the policy changes within the PRC itself which focuses on the “minority” problem not from showing respect for their distinctives but on the emphasis on Hanhua, or Sinicization.

IV. International Connections and Influence:
As briefly mentioned above, international interactions and connections are another historical and current area of concern for the PRC. For Xinjiang, this is even more of a concern because of the province bordering eight nations, and its minorities ethnic heritage to many Central Asian Turkic peoples. Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), beginning in 2013, coincided both with more violent attacks in Xinjiang, and the ramping up of PRC focus on Sinicization of religions and minorities. This gives a microcosm example of international “opening” and minority plus religious instability which would lead to local crackdown and intense regional security measures (Zenz, 2018). Many strict measures in Xinjiang began occurring from 2013 (as BRI began), and then intensified more from continued regional instability (2014-2017). China has a long history of desiring to maintain control of their populace’s international travel and connections. This is true to even greater extents today.

Clarke, Michael. 2016. “Beijing’s March West.” Orbis 60 (2): 296–313.

Zenz, Adrian, James Leibold. September 21, 2017. “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang.” China Brief. https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/ (accessed January 21, 2019).

In the above analyses Zenz and Leibold writes that at present, and into the near future, Xinjiang is “. . . Beijing’s top domestic security concern . . . First, Uyghur resistance and fear of ‘Islamic extremism’ are now viewed as a far greater threat to CCP rule than Tibetan unrest. [Why? Because . . .] Second, stability in Xinjiang is crucial to the success of Xi Jinping’s signature One Belt, One Road (一带一路) initiative, with Xinjiang reemerging as a ‘core region’ (核心区) and strategic crossroad for trade and investment opportunities in Central and South Asia, as well as Europe and the Middle East. . .” if not also Africa and Southeast Asia. Stricter pressure on local security as the CCP desires greater influence and trade, highly dependent on Xinjiang’s strategic crossroads, seems inevitable.

Bourmont, Martin De. April 3, 2018. “China’s Campaign Against Uighur Diaspora Ramps Up.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/03/chinas-campaign-against-uighur-diaspora-ramps-up/ (accessed January 21, 2019).

In this article the harassment, threat, and detainment of Uyghurs overseas, and their families in Xinjiang is detailed. This strategy is common in the PRC, especially with those it considers overseas dissidents. However, now this extended to those Uyghurs studying overseas with some reports of forcing Uyghur students to return to the mainland to report in.

Perper, Rosie. August 15, 2018. “China Appears to be Compiling a Massive Database of it Muslim Citizens Abroad to Keep Close Tabs on Them.” (accessed January 21, 2019).

This report includes details of how China is pressuring families of overseas Uyghurs, even ones who are not citizens of the PRC. Officials pressure for foreign and personal documentation for family members overseas for photos of ID cards, bank account details, marriage licenses, etc. This leads to an understanding that the PRC maintains a database of Uyghurs overseas, and utilizes family connections to pressure compliance to their information gathering.

Zenz, Adrian. 2018. “‘Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude’: China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang.” Central Asian Survey 1-27.

Here, Zenz gives the essential evidence for the Re-education camps, their historical escalation, and their present intensification. He also mentions Clarke’s “Beijing Marches West,” and the One Belt, One Road (BRI) Initiative concluding that the desire for greater influence has partly lead to the creation of the camps and other repressive measures in Xinjiang.

See the comments on this Canadian Parliamentary document above, in the section on academics. This document also focuses on the isolating, harassing, and forced return of Uyghurs studying and living overseas.

Conclusion

Intersections of PRC Concerns and Xinjiang Re-education Camp Internment

Chinese society and civilization, and historical governance of the Xinjiang region, has many different vectors of concern. These concerns have been negotiated in China, especially when they intersect each other, by governors, warlords, dynasties, and now the CCP. Below is a list of lines of concerns:

1. Religion, religious expression

2. Minorities, minority interaction, Cultural and language difference

3. Scholarship and academia

4. International influence and connections

The above is not an exhaustive list, but it gives some historical framework in understanding Chinese societal and political anxieties. Many scholars, Chinese governance can be partly explained through the traditional view of tianming– the idea that whoever governs does so through the “mandate of heaven.” This can have spiritual ramifications, but much of this idea today ties governance to stability, morality, and power being centralized in whoever can maintain both. Thus these “vectors” are felt to be areas of instability and immorality. In many ways these are defined by the majority Han, their view of Chinese-ness, and the PRC political views.

As the PRC views the current situation and instability in Xinjiang, especially in the last three decades of reform but even more so since 2009, they do so negotiating fears of where the areas of concern intersect. These negotiations do not always intersect where it is easy for Western political bodies to understand. Often the current situation in Xinjiang is seen as the PRC’s response to a Muslim population, having the oppression occurring through re-education camps being tied solely to Islamophobia and repression of that particular religious expression. While this is true, it is not the only religion in the crossfire, and the re-education camps do not take in just Muslims, or only Muslims extremists. Although the PRC has presented this view for Western media and diplomats, there are many more being interned. The militant Islamic struggle is not the only significant line of concern for the PRC to maintain their cultural and political view stability in the region.

We have seen many disappear, assumed to be taken to one of the many re-education camps, because of varying factors. The first, of course, is religious. Those who are devout Muslims, whether of traditional schools of thought like Hanafism, more mystical Sufi expression, or more militant Salafi influences (Thum 2016, Millward 2019). These can all be arrested, searched, and religious items confiscated. However, as mentioned above, this is not limited to just Uyghurs who are more militant, but any cultural or religious expression that un-nerves traditional Chinese view of normality. Beards, refusing to sell or drink alcohol, not smoking, and head coverings of varying kinds are all seen with degrees of concern (Thum 2016). Praying, and gathering in groups (privately or corporately) all fall into different lines of concern. At the same time, religious change is another concern for a traditional Chinese view. This is viewed as instability both on a local and regional level. Also, many of these religious actions are concerning to the Chinese government for Han Christians living in Xinjiang as well.

Though religious belief and practice is a strong vector of concern for the PRC as it strives for what it considers political and societal stability, it is not the only one. Uyghurs and others in Xinjiang can be questioned by police, consistently followed, or put in a camp for any international travel or connections. There are copious examples of secular Uyghurs and Uyghur scholars who have traveled or are studying overseas all having to endure official questioning, passports being confiscated, coercion to influence family members overseas to return to Xinjiang, and more.

Language and cultural differences are other lines of concern for the PRC authorities. These concerns are signs of possible instability and lack of adherence to Chinese political power. Uyghur language materials have been diminishing for many years. Though there continue to be approved works in Uyghur published and sold, Uyghur study and use is an area of concern. There are even reports of all Uyghur materials in the government approved Xinhua Shudian store in Kashgar being removed. This could partly be why speaking Putonghua in the re-education camps is mandatory.

Being a minority in Xinjiang in general is un-safe, not just a Uyghur or Uyghur Muslim. Kazaks, Kirgiz, Uzbek all have been taken to re-education camps. Minorities in general are seen as important lines of concern for the PRC, traditional Chinese governance, and even historical governance of Xinjiang.

The above examples, though short and generalized, reveal that PRC repression and re-education camps in Xinjiang are not just limited to Uyghur Muslims. There are many more lines of concern than just one religious belief, and any of the other concerns besides Islamic adherence can put one under official questioning and scrutiny, or in a re-education camp.